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Abstract
The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of long-term
debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive
power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict
excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together
account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent
with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the
lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.
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1. Introduction
How corporations should manage financial policy to minimize the cost of capital
is a question of great theoretical and practical interest. In efficient, integrated, and
otherwise perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz (1974)
show that financial policy cannot reduce the cost of capital. Their key insight is that
in such idealized markets, the costs of different forms of capital do not vary
independently, so there is never any gain to substituting between debt and equity, for
example, or between short- and long-term debt.
Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that equity financing is tied to stock
return predictability. Firms tend to issue equity when the equity premium is low, and
when their idiosyncratic returns are low. They tend to repurchase equity when
idiosyncratic returns are high.1 These patterns are interesting because they are not
straightforward implications of the Modigliani-Miller view or its standard
extensions. One prominent explanation for these patterns is that firms are timing
an inefficient or segmented capital market, and another is that optimal capital
structure and rational expected returns vary together over time. It is difficult to
distinguish between these explanations, and the truth may involve both.
In this paper, we ask whether time series variation in the maturity of debt issues is
tied to predictability in excess long-term bond returns. Relative to the literature on
equity financing patterns, and relative to the actual importance of debt financing in
the U.S. economy, the literature on debt financing patterns is surprisingly
undeveloped. We find strong evidence that firms tend to borrow long-term when
subsequent long-term bond returns are predictably low. Then we examine whether
this pattern is more consistent with debt market timing or with an explanation that
involves time-varying optimal debt maturity and rational variation in expected bond
returns.
The notion that debt maturity is related to debt market conditions can be found in
several prior studies. Bosworth (1971), White (1974), Taggart (1977), and Marsh
(1982) find that the level of debt issues is sensitive to various measures of interest
rates. In firm-level data, Guedes and Opler (1996) document that the maturity of
issues is negatively related to the term spread (the difference between the yields of
long- and short-term government debt), and Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and
Mauer (1996) find a similar result—that the maturity of debt on balance sheets is
negatively related to the term spread. While suggestive, none of these results address
whether debt maturity is related to the cost of borrowing at different maturities,
because none of them examine returns data.
Our approach is to see whether variation in the maturity of new debt issues is
connected to the debt market conditions that forecast excess bond returns, and to
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1Baker and Wurgler (2000) document that firms issue more equity, as a share of total equity and debt
issues, when the equity premium is low. Stigler (1964), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Speiss
and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Brav and Gompers (1997) find that (idiosyncratic) equity returns are low
following equity issues. Ikenberry et al. (1995) find that (idiosyncratic) equity returns are high following
repurchases. See Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Ritter (2003) for more comprehensive surveys of the
market timing literature.
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future excess bond returns themselves. We use two sources of debt issues data: the
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
various issues) and firm-by-firm aggregations of Compustat. The debt market
variables that we use to capture predictable variation in excess bond returns are
inflation (actual or expected), the real short-term interest rate (realized or ex ante),
the term spread, the credit spread, and the credit term spread. Future excess bond
returns are measured as the excess return of Treasury bonds over Treasury bills, and
as the excess return of high-grade corporate bonds over commercial paper. Most of
our tests use annual data covering 1953 through 2000.
Our main results are the following. First, inflation, the real short-term interest
rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns; when these market conditions
variables are high, future excess bond returns are high over the next one to three
years. Second, the long-term share in aggregate total debt issues is negatively related
to each of these variables. When put together, these two results indicate that firms
tend to borrow long when excess bond returns are predictably low, supporting our
main hypothesis. We also verify the predictability hypothesis directly by showing
that the long-term share in total debt issues is a good univariate predictor of excess
bond returns, taking on high values when future excess bond returns are low. The
three-year cumulative excess government bond returns that follow a bottom-quartile
share average 21.8 percentage points, while the returns following a top-quartile share
average 5:2 percentage points. In a more disaggregated analysis using Compustat
data, we find that these patterns tend to be strongest among large firms, old firms,
dividend-paying firms, and investment-grade firms.
These results establish that debt maturity choice is closely connected to predictable
variation in excess bond returns. We favor the interpretation that managers are
trying to time the debt market, but despite suggestive evidence one cannot determine
whether they are reducing the overall cost of capital because of the usual difficulties
of testing market efficiency. Several factors point to this interpretation. Using the
approach of Schwert (1989), we cannot connect the long-term share to risk that
seems likely to require a rational risk premium. Also, a review of the theory of
optimal maturity structure uncovers no straightforward reason why optimal debt
maturity would be inversely related to rational variation in expected excess bond
returns. Finally, and most convincing, the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001)
points directly to debt market timing as a motivation in debt financing decisions. A
large fraction of chief financial officers prefer short-term debt ‘‘when short-term
interest rates are low compared to long-term rates’’ and when they are ‘‘waiting for
long-term interest rates to decline.’’2 Indeed, these statements are more common
among some of the same types of firms that our Compustat tests identify as
particularly sensitive to debt market conditions.
Our results are complemented by an interesting recent study by Kaplin and Levy
(2001). They use a variable like our long-term share to predict excess bond returns at
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2Managers focus more on public information about general debt market conditions than private
information about credit quality. Graham and Harvey find that only 9% of managers state that ‘‘we
expect our credit rating to improve, so we borrow short-term until it does.’’
M. Baker et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 70 (2003) 261–291 263
higher frequencies, one to six months. The relative advantage of our data is that they
allow us to study a longer period, almost five decades versus the one decade in the
Kaplin and Levy study. This permits us to more thoroughly document the time series
relationships between debt issue maturity and market conditions, which display the
bulk of their variation at horizons longer than a few months. Also, for managers
trying to gain a cost advantage through timing, the cumulative return over the life of
the security is more relevant than a short-horizon return. Our longer prediction
horizons are therefore more useful for evaluating the debt market timing hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the predictable variation in
excess bond returns related to debt market conditions. Section 3 uses debt issues data
from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds to examine how market conditions affect the
debt issue maturity and its predictive power for excess bond returns. Section 4
examines these questions using aggregated Compustat data. Section 5 discusses
alternative interpretations for the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Debt market conditions and predictable variation in excess bond returns
In this section we describe the predictable variation in excess bond returns. This is
a prerequisite to understanding the relation between the maturity of debt issues and
expected excess bond returns, the topic of subsequent sections.
2.1. Debt market conditions and excess bond returns data
The basic data include annual time series from 1953 through 2000 on the maturity
of corporate debt issues, debt market conditions such as interest rates and inflation,
and excess bond returns. The Federal Reserve pegged nominal Treasury bill rates up
to 1952, so most academic studies of the government bond market begin in 1953. We
follow this convention.
Debt market conditions are represented by seven variables: inflation; expected
inflation; the realized real short-term rate; the ex ante real short-term rate; the term
spread; the credit spread; and the credit term spread. Actual inflation ðpAtÞ is the
annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index. Expected inflation ðpEtÞ is
the expected appreciation of the Consumer Price Index over the coming year
estimated following the procedure in Fama and Gibbons (1982).3 The realized real
short-term rate ðyGSt  pAtÞ is estimated as the annualized December Treasury bill
return minus actual inflation. The ex ante real short-term rate ðyGSt  pEtÞ is
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3We implement the Kalman filter procedure of Fama and Gibbons (1982, Table 1, Eqs. (6) and (8)),
decomposing the Treasury bill yield into expected inflation and the real short-term interest rate. There are
two concerns with this analysis. First, the decomposition depends on a structural assumption about the
process of the real interest rate. Second, we are using an in-sample estimation of the real interest rate to
forecast future returns. Fortunately, none of our qualitative conclusions are sensitive to whether we use
actual inflation or this measure of expected inflation, and we report results both ways.
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estimated as the annualized December Treasury bill return minus expected inflation.
The term spread ðyGLt  yGStÞ is the difference between the December Treasury bond
yield and the annualized December Treasury bill return. Most research on bond
return predictability focuses on the term spread (Shiller, 1979; Shiller et al., 1983;
Fama 1984; Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Fama and Bliss, 1987; Fama and French,
1989; Campbell and Shiller, 1991), while Ferson and Harvey (1991, 1993) consider a
larger set of components of the term structure. The credit spread ðyCSt  yGStÞ is the
difference between the December commercial paper yield and the annualized
December Treasury bill return. Finally, the credit term spread ððyCLt  yGLtÞ 
ðyCSt  yGStÞÞ involves the December Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and the
other yields just introduced. These series are based on data from Ibbotson
Associates.
Excess bond returns are measured by an index of Treasury bonds over bills and
an index of investment-grade corporate bonds over commercial paper. Returns
on long-term government bonds ðrGLtÞ; short-term government bills ðrGStÞ; high-
grade long-term corporate bonds ðrCLtÞ; and commercial paper ðrCStÞ are from
Ibbotson Associates. The government and corporate bond indexes track portfolios
that are continually redefined so as to keep a constant 20-year maturity.4 Excess
government and corporate bond returns in year t are ðrGLt  rGStÞ and ðrCLt  rCStÞ;
respectively. Cumulative excess returns are denoted ðRGLtþk  RGStþkÞ and ðRCLtþk 
RCStþkÞ; where the accumulation includes years t þ 1 through t þ k: In our tests
we cumulate returns for up to three years. In principle, these excess returns
correspond to the actual relative cost of straight short- and long-term debt
for a representative firm. The most relevant period is the life of the bond,
which could be ten or more years, though with open market repurchases, the
relevant period could be any shorter length. In any case, beyond three years,
we do not have enough nonoverlapping samples to do meaningful statistical
analysis.
These variables are summarized in Table 1 and Fig. 1. Panel A of Fig. 1 reveals a
loose negative correlation between inflation (actual or expected) and the real short-
term rate (realized or ex ante) since 1953, indicating that the nominal short rate is an
important source of variation. Panel B displays the inversion of the yield curve at
several points in the 1970s. Term spread inversions appear to portend recessions
(Fama and French, 1989) and the credit spread appears to be somewhat
countercyclical. Panel C shows the high volatility of both excess government
and corporate bond returns in the last 30 years. It also shows the high correlation
(0.95) between excess Treasury bond returns and excess high-grade corporate
bond returns.
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4The government bond returns series uses data from the Wall Street Journal for 1977 through 2000 and
the Center for Research in Security Prices Government Bond File for 1976 and earlier. The corporate bond
returns series uses the Salomon Brothers Long-Term High-Grade Corporate Bond Index, which includes
most Aaa- and Aa-rated bonds, for 1969 through 2000, a backdated Salomon Brothers return series for
1968 and earlier.
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2.2. Predicting excess bond returns with debt market conditions
Table 2 shows regressions that predict excess bond returns using inflation, the real
short-term rate, the term spread, the credit spread, and the credit term spread. Some
of the closest antecedents for these specifications are Ferson and Harvey (1991,
1993), who study monthly returns. The first specification in Panel A predicts one-
year-ahead excess Treasury bond returns,
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ bpt þ cðyGSt  ptÞ þ dðyGLt  yGStÞ þ eðyCSt  yGStÞ
þ f ððyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞÞ þ utþ1; ð1Þ
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Table 1
Debt market conditions, excess bond returns, and the maturity of corporate debt issues, 1953–2000
Mean, standard deviation, autocorrelation coefficient, and extreme values of basic annual variables. All
variables are expressed in percentage terms. In Panel A, we decompose the annualized December Treasury
bill return into actual inflation ðpAÞ and the realized real short-term rate ðyGS  pAÞ: We also construct
expected inflation ðpEÞ and the ex ante real interest rate ðyGS  pEÞ following Fama and Gibbons (1982).
The term spread ðyGL  yGSÞ is the difference between the annualized December long-term government
bond yield and the annualized December Treasury bill return. The credit spread ðyCS  yGSÞ is the
difference between the commercial paper yield and the annualized December Treasury bill return. The
credit term spread ððyCL  yGLÞ  ðyCS  yGSÞÞ is the difference between the December Baa corporate bond
yield and the December long-term government bond yield minus the credit spread. In Panel B, excess bond
returns are measured as the difference between the annual return on long-term government bonds and
Treasury bills ðrGL  rGSÞ and the difference between the annual return on corporate bonds and
commercial paper ðrCL  rCSÞ: All bond market data are from Ibbotson Associates. In Panel C, the data
are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate
bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and
other short-term loans and advances. All short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. The
change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt is assumed to be new long-term issues.
(%) N Mean SD r Min Max
Panel A: Debt market conditions
pAt 47 4.03 3.74 0.70 0.76 18.20
pEt 47 4.04 3.16 0.79 0.50 13.31
yGSt  pAt 47 1.65 2.18 0.76 2.92 6.60
yGSt  pEt 47 1.63 1.82 0.52 3.50 5.28
yGLt  yGSt 47 1.12 1.61 0.40 4.87 4.41
yCSt  yGSt 47 0.61 0.57 0.34 0.40 2.81
ðyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞ 47 0.01 0.66 0.38 1.91 1.19
Panel B: Excess bond returns
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 1.32 10.28 0.12 13.65 26.97
rCLtþ1  rCStþ1 47 0.66 9.66 0.01 14.86 26.95
Panel C: Maturity of corporate debt issues
dLt=Dt1 47 11.42 2.06 0.45 7.42 17.09
dSt=Dt1 47 41.44 6.01 0.90 29.74 54.70
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 47 21.78 3.98 0.67 14.10 28.96
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Fig. 1. Debt market conditions and excess bond returns, 1953–2000. In Panel A, we decompose the annualized
December Treasury bill return into actual inflation ðpAÞ and the realized real short-term rate ðyGS  pAÞ: We also
construct expected inflation ðpE Þ and the ex ante real interest rate ðyGS  pE Þ following Fama and Gibbons (1982). In
Panel B, the term spread ðyGL  yGSÞ is the difference between the annualized December long-term government bond
yield and the annualized December Treasury bill return. The credit spread ðyCS  yGSÞ is the difference between the
commercial paper yield and the annualized December Treasury bill return. The credit term spread ððyCL  yGLÞ 
ðyCS  yGSÞÞ is the difference between the December Baa corporate bond yield and the December long-term government
bond yield minus the credit spread. In Panel C, excess bond returns are measured as the difference between the annual
return on long-term government bonds and Treasury bills ðrGL  rGSÞ and the difference between the annual return on
corporate bonds and commercial paper ðrCL  rCSÞ: All data are from Ibbotson Associates.
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Table 2
Debt market conditions and excess bond returns
OLS regressions predicting excess bond returns using inflation ðpÞ; the real short-term rate ðyGS  pÞ; the term spread ðyGL  yGSÞ; the credit spread
ðyCS  yGSÞ; and the credit term spread ððyCL  yGLÞ  ðyCS  yGSÞÞ: We also reduce the regressions to a standardized univariate prediction. The specification
for predicting one-year-ahead excess government bond returns, for example, is
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ bpt þ cðyGSt  ptÞ þ dðyGLt  yGStÞ þ eðyCSt  yGStÞ þ f ððyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞÞ þ gð #RLtþ1  #RStþ1Þ þ utþ1:
Excess bond returns are expressed in percentage terms. The independent variables are standardized to have unit variance. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
the excess return on long-term government bonds over Treasury bills ðrGL  rGSÞ and inflation is expected inflation ðpEÞ: In Panel B, inflation is actual inflation
ðpAÞ: In Panel C, the dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds over commercial paper ðrCL  rCSÞ and inflation is expected inflation ðpE Þ: Each
panel predicts one-year-ahead, two-year-ahead, and three-year-ahead returns ðrÞ as well as cumulative three-year returns ðRÞ: t-statistics are heteroskedasticity
robust and correct for time-series dependence up to three lags.
pt yGSt  pt yGLt  yGSt yCSt  yGSt ðyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞ #RLtþk  #RStþk
ð%Þ N b ½t c ½t d ½t e ½t f ½t g ½t R2
Panel A: Excess government bond returns ðpt ¼ pEtÞ
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 3.68 [1.74] 3.45 [3.21] 4.17 [3.38] 1.77 [0.49] 0.64 [0.22] 0.25
rGLtþ2  rGStþ2 46 1.66 [0.67] 3.60 [2.39] 0.53 [0.25] 5.67 [1.32] 4.17 [1.14] 0.14
rGLtþ3  rGStþ3 45 3.11 [1.38] 3.99 [2.77] 0.54 [0.22] 0.77 [0.20] 0.50 [0.17] 0.11
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 8.70 [1.65] 11.26 [5.54] 4.44 [1.12] 3.42 [0.40] 1.80 [0.27] 0.41
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 5.14 [5.52] 0.25
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 10.70 [6.64] 0.41
Panel B: Excess government bond returns ðpt ¼ pAtÞ
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 4.65 [1.68] 5.63 [2.22] 4.83 [4.85] 1.73 [0.40] 0.45 [0.13] 0.24
rGLtþ2  rGStþ2 46 1.41 [0.43] 7.80 [2.30] 0.47 [0.27] 7.16 [1.46] 5.34 [1.30] 0.16
rGLtþ3  rGStþ3 45 3.62 [1.28] 7.52 [2.37] 1.48 [0.82] 1.52 [0.33] 0.18 [0.05] 0.10
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 10.11 [1.55] 21.19 [5.23] 7.11 [2.97] 5.57 [0.56] 3.73 [0.49] 0.40
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 5.06 [5.53] 0.24
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 10.58 [5.85] 0.40
Panel C: Excess corporate bond returns ðpt ¼ pEtÞ
rCLtþ1  rCStþ1 47 2.63 [1.40] 2.92 [2.44] 4.11 [3.52] 0.78 [0.25] 1.92 [0.70] 0.30
rCLtþ2  rCStþ2 46 2.04 [0.74] 3.78 [2.84] 0.78 [0.39] 5.04 [1.08] 3.34 [0.81] 0.16
rCLtþ3  rCStþ3 45 3.37 [1.47] 3.90 [3.05] 0.38 [0.16] 1.32 [0.30] 1.15 [0.36] 0.14
RCLtþ3  RCStþ3 45 7.91 [1.45] 11.11 [5.52] 3.65 [1.00] 6.30 [0.69] 3.50 [0.47] 0.41
rCLtþ1  rCStþ1 47 5.23 [5.01] 0.30
RCLtþ3  RCStþ3 45 10.67 [6.24] 0.41
M
.
B
a
k
er
et
a
l.
/
J
o
u
rn
a
l
o
f
F
in
a
n
cia
l
E
co
n
o
m
ics
7
0
(
2
0
0
3
)
2
6
1
–
2
9
1
2
6
8
using expected inflation ðpEtÞ to measure inflation. Other specifications in Panel A
predict two- and three-year-ahead returns and cumulative three-year-ahead returns.
Panel B replaces expected inflation with actual inflation, and Panel C examines
corporate bond returns. The standard errors in all regressions are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of up to three lags using the procedure of
Newey and West (1987). The alternative adjustments of Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
and Hodrick (1992) to correct for overlapping cumulative returns do not change the
basic inferences. Returns are expressed in percentage terms while the independent
variables are standardized to have unit variance. (Throughout the paper we use the
convention of standardizing the independent variables. This allows the relative
magnitude of the coefficients to be easily assessed, since each one measures the effect
of a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable.)
Table 2 shows that future excess government bond returns are positively related to
inflation (actual or expected), the real short rate (realized or ex ante), and the term
spread. As is widely recognized, the term spread is a useful one-year-ahead predictor, but
the predictive power of inflation and particularly the real short rate is also notable. For
cumulative three-year returns, the real short rate emerges as the strongest predictor,
although precise statistical inference is difficult in overlapping return regressions.
Of particular concern is the R2 statistic. Mean reversion, overlapping data, and the
persistence of the independent variables lead to an R2 statistic that could
automatically rise with horizon (e.g. Campbell et al., 1997, p. 272). In addition,
Kirby (1997) derives a small-sample bias in R2 that increases with the overlap.
Intuitively, the bias comes from two facts: First, the standard error of the R2 statistic
increases with horizon; and second, the R2 is never below zero. As a result, the R2
statistic must not be viewed as an unbiased estimate of model fit.
In the last two rows of each panel we combine the five market conditions, each
weighted by its least squares coefficient, into a single fitted value. By construction,
this fitted value explains the same fraction of variation in future returns. Later in the
paper, we will use this fitted value as a summary measure of expected excess bond
returns, and we will also outline the alternative interpretations of the predictability
that it captures.5 The purpose of Table 2 is simply to demonstrate that a set of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
5Combining this information into a single regressor also allows us to address the small-sample bias
analyzed in Nelson and Kim (1993) and Stambaugh (1999) in a simple manner. Those authors point out
that autocorrelated predictors whose innovations are negatively (positively) correlated with innovations in
excess returns will have upward-biased (downward-biased) estimates. This suggests a potential statistical
problem with the Table 2 results. First, inflation, the real short rate, and the term spread add up to the long
rate. Second, the long rate is highly autocorrelated. Third, its innovations are almost perfectly negatively
correlated with innovations in excess bond returns. However, it turns out that the fitted value has a
correlation of only 0.6 with the long rate, because the coefficients on inflation, the real short rate, and the
term spread—when not standardized—are quite different. More importantly, the innovations in the fitted
value are statistically uncorrelated with innovations in the long rate. The bias-adjusted estimate for the
fitted value coefficient suggested by Stambaugh (1999) confirms that the combined predictive power of
these market conditions is robust. Because the innovations in the fitted value are also uncorrelated with
innovations in excess returns, the adjustment has no effect on the coefficient. In Panel A, for example, the
bias-adjusted coefficient for the one-year-ahead fitted value is 5.17 (unreported), larger than the least-
squares estimate reported in the table.
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market conditions variables can predict a nontrivial amount of excess bond return
variation. This in turn suggests the hypothesis that the relative cost of long-term
borrowing is predictable enough to influence the maturity of corporate debt issues
whether predictable variation represents inefficiency or compensation for risk is a
topic we defer until our discussion section. We turn now to this hypothesis.
3. Debt issue maturity and the relative cost of long-term debt: Flow of Funds sample
Here we explore how the maturity of corporate debt issues is related to market
conditions and predictable variation in excess bond returns. We focus on aggregate
time series data because we are most interested in time series relations with
government bond yields and returns, for which there is a single observation in each
time period. (Firm-level data do not help us to study such relationships.) In this
section we analyze aggregate debt issues data from the Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds, following Bosworth (1971), White (1974), and Taggart (1977), for example.
Of course, this fully aggregated data hides any cross-sectional differences in behavior
that might be due to variation in firm characteristics. We explore this possibility in a
subsequent section, by analyzing time series of debt issues generated from various
firm-by-firm Compustat aggregations.
3.1. Flow of Funds debt issues data
The Federal Reserve gathers capital market flows data from a variety of internal
and commercial sources. The available accounts cover 1945 through 2000. As
mentioned above, we follow recent fixed income research and start at 1953. (Most
results have slightly greater statistical significance if we extend the data back to
1945.) The data are taken from the credit market liabilities of the nonfarm,
nonfinancial corporate business sector (Table L.102 in the accounts). We ignore
noncredit market liabilities because we lack information on their maturity and
because they are less likely to be affected by debt market conditions.
Our intuition is that, each year, corporations make explicit decisions regarding
maturity. Assuming that existing long-term debt cannot be easily retired, the relevant
decision concerns the total of all existing short-term debt, the maturing portion of
long-term debt, and the increase in total debt outstanding. The Federal Reserve
defines short-term credit market debt outstanding as the sum of ‘‘commercial
paper,’’ ‘‘bank loans not elsewhere classified,’’ and ‘‘other loans and advances.’’ As
reported by the Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts, commercial paper typically has
a maturity of six months or less. Bank loans not elsewhere classified refers to
commercial and industrial loans held by U.S. banks. Other loans and advances
includes loans to nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business held by savings
institutions and the government, acceptance liabilities to banks, foreign loans to
U.S. entities, and business loans held by issuers of asset-backed securities. Over the
sample, commercial paper represents an average of 6.2% of short-term debt. Bank
debt and other loans and advances average 67.1% and 26.7% of total short-term
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debt, respectively. These proportions are fairly stable throughout the sample. We
define short-term debt issues ðdStÞ as the ending level of short-term credit market
debt outstanding.
Long-term credit market debt outstanding is defined by the Federal Reserve as the
sum of ‘‘industrial revenue bonds,’’ ‘‘corporate bonds,’’ and ‘‘mortgages.’’ Industrial
revenue bonds are issued by state and local governments to finance private
investment and are secured in principal by the industrial user of the bonds.
Mortgages include construction loans, multifamily mortgage debt, and commercial
mortgage debt, less commercial mortgage debt of nonprofit organizations, and less
commercial mortgage debt of nonfarm noncorporate business. Over the sample,
industrial revenue bonds average only 3.8% of total long-term debt. Corporate
bonds and mortgages respectively average 73.8% and 22.3% of total long-term debt.
These figures are also relatively stable through the sample. We define long-term debt
issues ðdLtÞ as the gross change in the level of long-term credit market debt
outstanding, plus one-tenth the level of long-term debt in the previous year. This
assumes that one-tenth of long-term debt matures each year.6
To measure the level of debt issues while controlling for growth in the economy,
we scale issues by lagged total credit-market debt outstanding ðdSt=Dt1 and
dLt=Dt1Þ: To control for the level of total issues and thereby isolate the maturity
decision, we construct the long-term share in total debt issues ðdLt=½dLt þ dStÞ: This
variable is our main focus in the rest of the paper.
We examine the level of the long-term share in debt issues for two reasons. First,
this roughly corresponds to an aggregate version of Guedes and Opler (1996), who
study maturity choice in a large cross-section, and to a maturity structure version of
Baker and Wurgler (2000), who study the marketwide decision to issue equity versus
debt of any maturity. Second, our aim is to study the effect of market conditions on
maturity choice. If the long-term share is a noisy measure of underlying market
conditions and these market conditions are persistent, levels of the long-term share
will more accurately measure the preference for long-term debt than changes, which
will be dominated by measurement error.
The strengths of the Flow of Funds data are its consistent definitions, its
availability over a long time span (crucial for our purposes), and its comprehensive
coverage. At the same time, the data have several shortcomings. First, one would like
to have detailed data on maturity. We cannot tell, for example, whether long-term
debt is five-year or 30-year maturity. Dividing issues between short and all other
maturities is still useful, however, given that most movement in the yield curve
occurs between short and intermediate-and-longer maturities.
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consistent with Guedes and Opler (1996), who report that the median maturity of debt issues is ten years in
their sample. It might be possible to glean additional information about the appropriate retirement rate
from the pattern of new issues. The intuition is that if there is a lump of long-term issues today, then when
this debt retires, more of the change in long-term debt should be attributed to new issues. We attempted to
incorporate this intuition and found that the adjusted series has a correlation of 0.94 with the simpler
measure and does not change the basic results. We therefore report results for the simpler, unadjusted
measure.
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Second, one would like data on floating rate features. Maturity and effective cost
characteristics are usually directly related, but in the case of floating-rate debt, the
relationship is blurred. A long-term floating rate issue, for example, has cost
characteristics like short-term debt. One place where this distinction is important is
in the Flow of Funds classification of bank loans as short-term debt. Although some
of these loans undoubtedly have terms longer than one year, they are also frequently
tied to floating rates (especially in the later half of the sample), so by cost
characteristics they are short-term (as indicated in footnote (3) in the September 18,
2001 release of Table L.102, for example). Since our focus is on understanding
variation in the maturity of new issues that is due to variation in relative cost
characteristics, classifying bank loans as short-term does not seem inappropriate.
Third, one would like data on callability. A call provision reduces the effective
maturity of an issue, and changes its cost characteristics accordingly. However, since
call protection typically extends several years from the issue date, the cost of callable
debt is likely to resemble that of straight debt for at least the first few years of the
issue (the prediction horizon we consider). According to Van Horne (1984), long-
term public issues before the late 1950s were generally immediately callable. As the
nominal targeting period passed and interest rate volatility increased, investors
began to demand call protections. By the late 1960s, the majority of public issues had
call protections of five or ten years.
We attempt to address these limitations of the data in robustness tests. We
consider alternative assumptions about the retirement rate of long-term debt, and
use other data sources to get a handle on the effect of trends in callability and
floating rate features.7 Our exploration of Compustat data also addresses some
limitations of the Flow of Funds data, but introduces limitations of its own. All things
considered, we view the Flow of Funds long-term share variable as a rough but useful
guide to broad trends in the maturity of debt issues.
Table 1 and Fig. 2 summarize these data. Panel A of Fig. 2 indicates that the
scaled level of short-term debt issues has generally increased since 1953 but has fallen
from its 1984 maximum. Panel B reveals no clear patterns in the level of long-term
debt issues. Panel C shows that the long-term share in total debt issues has therefore
declined slightly since 1953 but has rebounded in recent years. While the variation in
the long-term share is not visibly dramatic, it is economically substantial. To
illustrate this, note that the long-term share ranges between 14% (in 1990) and 29%
(in 1958). Total debt issues were $1.5 trillion in 1990, so in order to move from 14%
to 29%, long-term debt issues in 1990 would have required a substitution of $225
billion of short-term issues for long-term issues. Moreover, since the long-term share
is defined using a one-year maturity breakpoint, it would not reveal a wholesale
switch from 30-year to five-year issues, for example. On the other hand, the same
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content of the long-term share variable before 1982, when the swaps market came into existence. After
1982, not accounting for swaps may reduce the information content of the aggregate long-term share to
the extent that one counterparty is outside the sample (e.g., offshore). If both counterparties are in the
sample, swaps have no net effect, since they do not reduce the aggregate exposure to interest rate
fluctuations, they just redistribute it.
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Fig. 2. The maturity of corporate debt issues: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data. Long-term debt
includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes short-term
debt, which is the sum of commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and other short-term
loans and advances. New short-term issues are defined as short-term debt outstanding. New long-term
issues are defined as the change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt. Panel A shows
short-term issues scaled by lagged total debt (dashed) and long-term issues scaled by lagged total debt
(solid). Panel B shows the long-term share of total debt issues. All variables are expressed in percentage
terms.
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logic suggests at least the possibility that when the long-term share does vary, the
actual variation in maturity could be substantial.
Panel C also indicates NBER recessions as shaded areas, and reveals no visible
business-cycle pattern in the long-term share. The average long-term share during
recessions, broadly defined to include any calendar year that includes an NBER
recession, was 22.5%, and the average during expansions was 21.4%. The difference
is not statistically significant. The grand mean long-term share is 21.8%, and the
figure shows that the most recent values are slightly above this average.
3.2. Market conditions and the maturity of debt issues
In Table 3 we examine how debt market conditions affect the maturity of
corporate debt issues. Panel A includes all debt market conditions measures, even
those that do not predict excess bond returns, so as to be consistent with earlier
tables. The specification in the first row is
dLt
dLt þ dSt
¼ a þ bpt þ cðyGSt  ptÞ þ dðyGLt  yGStÞ þ eðyCSt  yGStÞ
þ f ððyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞÞ þ ut; ð3Þ
where the inflation measure is expected inflation ðpEtÞ: Panel B uses actual inflation.
As before, we standardize the independent variables but not the dependent variable.
The long-term share is negatively related to inflation, the real interest rate, and the
term spread, and insignificantly related to the credit spread and the credit term
spread. Market conditions also explain a large fraction of the time series variation in
maturity. Note that this pattern of coefficients corresponds exactly to the pattern of
coefficients in bond return predictive regressions from Eq. (1). Variables that enter
positively there enter negatively here; variables that are insignificant there are also
insignificant here. A natural interpretation is that firms borrow long when debt
market conditions suggest that the relative cost of long-term debt is low. We outline
other interpretations in the discussion section.
One way to verify that the maturity of debt issues responds to the same variation
in market conditions that governs the relative cost of long-term borrowing is by
using the fitted excess return from Table 2 as the lone regressor. The second
specification in each panel uses this fitted return to explain variation in the long-term
share:
dLt
dLt þ dSt
¼ a þ gð #RGLtþ3  #RGStþ3Þ þ ut: ð4Þ
These regressions show more directly that the maturity of issues is sensitive to
predictable variation in excess bond returns. Interestingly, the predicted excess bond
return, by itself, explains nearly as much of the variation in the long-term share as do
the five debt market variables when they are allowed to enter in an unrestricted
way—in other words, the adjusted R2 falls by less than 0.03 from the first to the
second specification.
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Table 3
Debt market conditions and the maturity of corporate debt issues, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data
OLS regressions of the long-term share of total debt issues ðdL=½dL þ dS Þ on inflation ðpÞ; the real short-term rate ðyGS  pÞ; the term spread ðyGL  yGSÞ; the
credit spread ðyCS  yGSÞ; and the credit term spread ððyCL  yGLÞ  ðyCS  yGSÞÞ: We also consider the predicted excess long-term government bond return
from Table 2 as an independent variable.
dLt
dLt þ dSt
¼ a þ bpt þ cðyGSt  ptÞ þ dðyGLt  yGStÞ þ eðyCSt  yGStÞ þ f ððyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞÞ þ gð #RGLtþ3  #RGStþ3Þ þ ut:
The long-term share is expressed in percentage terms and the independent variables are standardized to have unit variance. In Panel A, inflation is expected
inflation ðpt ¼ pEtÞ: In Panel B, inflation is actual inflation ðpt ¼ pAtÞ: t-statistics are heteroskedasticity robust and correct for time-series dependence up to
three lags.
ð%Þ N pt yGSt  pt yGLt  yGSt yCSt  yGSt ðyCLt  yGLtÞ  ðyCSt  yGStÞ #RGLtþ3  #RGStþ3 R2
b ½t c ½t d ½t e ½t f ½t g ½t
Panel A: The long-term share of total debt issues ðpt ¼ pEtÞ
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 47 3.02 [4.53] 2.68 [4.62] 0.93 [1.51] 0.00 [0.00] 0.46 [0.39] 0.45
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 47 2.42 [5.95] 0.37
Panel B: The long-term share of total debt issues ðpt ¼ pAtÞ
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 47 3.45 [4.37] 5.32 [4.67] 1.30 [3.09] 0.46 [0.38] 0.83 [0.71] 0.46
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 47 2.46 [5.95] 0.38
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3.3. Predicting excess bond returns from the maturity of debt issues
These results naturally raise the question of whether the maturity of debt issues
itself predicts excess bond returns. Fig. 3 divides the Flow of Funds long-term share
into quartiles and tabulates it against one-year-ahead and cumulative three-year-
ahead excess returns. The figure confirms that there is a negative univariate
relationship between the long-term share and subsequent excess returns. The three-
year cumulative excess government bond returns that follow a bottom-quartile
share average 21.8 percentage points, while the returns following a top-quartile share
average 5:2 percentage points. For corporate bond returns, the difference is 19.5
versus 4:9; and the relationship across quartiles is monotonic. Note that predicted
excess returns switch signs.
Table 4 investigates this predictive power more formally. The first row of Panel A,
for example, reports two specifications:
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b1
dLt
Dt1
þ b2
dSt
Dt1
þ ut; ð5aÞ
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b
dLt
dLt þ dSt
þ ut: ð5bÞ
The results for Eq. (5a) indicate that long-term debt issues predict lower excess
returns and short-term debt issues predict higher excess returns, as expected. While
there appears to be useful information in both variables, the results for Eq. (5b)
indicate that this information is effectively summarized in the long-term share in
total debt issues. By itself, this variable is about as good a predictor as
the combination of the levels R2 is similar for Eqs. (5b) and (5a). The long-term
share is generally successful at predicting the excess return in each of the next three
years, and consequently is successful at predicting the cumulative three-year-ahead
return.8
One might ask whether debt issue decisions embody any incremental informa-
tion over the set of debt market conditions we have been analyzing. This
would in fact be surprising, given that firms do not have inside information
about the course of interest rates, but they could also be responding to other public
information besides the market conditions we consider. In the left columns of
Table 5, we regress excess bond returns on debt issues and the predicted value
of returns based on market conditions. For example, the regression in Column 2
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priori. The long-term share is indeed highly autocorrelated, but there is no mechanical reason why its
innovations would be correlated with innovations in excess bond returns. In fact, we find they are not
correlated, so the correction suggested by Stambaugh does not materially affect the least-squares
estimates. For one-year-ahead excess government returns, for example, the bias-corrected coefficient is
3:14 (unreported) compared to the least-squares coefficient of 3:18:
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Fig. 3. The maturity of corporate debt issues and subsequent excess bond returns: Flow of Funds data.
Excess government bond returns as predicted by the historical quartile of the prior year long-term share of
total debt issues. Data on the maturity of corporate debt issues come from the Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds. Panel A shows excess government bond returns. Panel B shows excess corporate bond returns.
Excess bond returns are calculated for one-year-ahead (solid) and cumulative three-year-ahead (hatch)
periods.
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of Panel A is
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b
dLt
dLt þ dSt
þ cð #RGLtþk  #RGSþkÞ þ utþ1: ð6Þ
For one-year-ahead excess returns, debt issue maturity does not add much to the
predictability based on market conditions. In Panel A for example, the long-term
share is insignificant and the regression has an R2 of 0:26 in Column 2. Column 1
shows that without the long-term share, market conditions alone provide an R2 of
0.25. There is some evidence of incremental predictive power for three-year
cumulative returns.
Most bond market research focuses exclusively on the term spread, so one may be
interested to know whether the long-term share adds predictive power to this
variable alone. The right columns of Table 5 indicate that the long-term share does
indeed add significant predictive power to the term spread, even at the one-year
horizon. The important insight from these results is not whether the predictive power
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Table 4
The maturity of corporate debt issues and excess bond returns, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data
OLS regressions predicting excess bond returns using the maturity of corporate debt issues [X]. The
specification for predicting one-year-ahead excess government bond returns, for example, is
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b0Xt þ utþ1:
Excess bond returns are expressed in percentage terms. The independent variables are standardized to
have unit variance. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the excess return on long-term government
bonds over Treasury bills. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds
over commercial paper. We predict one-year-ahead, two-year-ahead, and three-year-ahead returns ðrÞ;
and cumulative three-year-ahead returns ðRÞ: We measure changes in the maturity structure as new
issues of long-term debt ðdL=Dt1Þ controlling for new issues of short-term debt ðdS=Dt1Þ and as the long-
term share of total new issues ðdL=½dL þ dS Þ: t-statistics are heteroskedasticity robust and correct for time-
series dependence up to three lags. The F -test reports the joint significance level of ðdL=Dt1Þ and
ðdS=Dt1Þ:
dLt=Dt1 dSt=Dt1 dLt=½dLt þ dSt
ð%Þ N b1 ½t b2 ½t ½F  R2 N b ½t R2
Panel A: Excess government bond returns
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 1.83 [1.29] 2.82 [2.60] [0.01] 0.11 47 3.18 [2.99] 0.10
rGLtþ2  rGStþ2 46 1.62 [1.52] 2.89 [2.97] [0.01] 0.11 46 3.06 [2.78] 0.09
rGLtþ3  rGStþ3 45 2.65 [1.97] 3.26 [3.21] [0.00] 0.17 45 4.07 [3.15] 0.15
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 6.47 [2.91] 8.86 [3.98] [0.00] 0.43 45 10.47 [4.90] 0.39
Panel B: Excess corporate bond returns
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 47 2.32 [2.13] 2.59 [2.31] [0.00] 0.13 47 3.31 [3.93] 0.12
rGLtþ2  rGStþ2 46 1.79 [1.60] 2.74 [2.96] [0.01] 0.12 46 3.10 [2.83] 0.10
rGLtþ3  rGStþ3 45 2.31 [1.65] 3.00 [2.76] [0.02] 0.15 45 3.65 [2.68] 0.14
RGLtþ3  RGStþ3 45 6.40 [3.35] 8.43 [3.55] [0.00] 0.41 45 10.08 [4.71] 0.36
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of the long-term share is greater than that of any other variable, but that its
predictive ability appears to reflect its connection to market conditions.
3.4. Robustness of the Flow of Funds results
In Table 6 we examine several robustness issues. For reference, the first row
repeats the baseline predictability results from Table 4. The next two rows address
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Table 5
The maturity of corporate debt issues, debt market conditions, and excess bond returns, Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds data
OLS regressions predicting excess bond returns using the long-term share of total debt issues and debt
market conditions. The general specification for predicting one-year-ahead excess government bond
returns, for example, is
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b
dLt
dLt þ dSt
þ cð #RLtþ1  #RStþ1Þ þ dðyGLt  yGStÞ þ utþ1:
Excess bond returns are expressed in percentage terms. The independent variables are standardized to have
unit variance. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the excess return on long-term government bonds over
Treasury bills. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds over commercial
paper. We predict one-year-ahead and cumulative three-year-ahead returns. We control for debt market
conditions in two ways. In the first four columns, we include the predicted excess long-term government
bond return from Table 2. In the second four columns, we include the term spread. t-statistics in brackets
are heteroskedasticity robust and correct for time-series dependence up to three lags.
Increment over forecast return Increment over term spread
1-year return Cum. 3-year return 1-year return Cum. 3-year return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Excess government bond returns
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 0.94 6.12 2.84 10.11
[0.77] [2.52] [3.52] [4.90]
#RGLtþk  #RGStþk 5.14 4.70 10.70 6.92
[5.52] [3.95] [6.64] [3.65]
yGLt  yGSt 3.60 3.36 4.18 3.32
[4.73] [3.70] [1.83] [2.08]
N 47 47 45 45 47 47 45 45
R2 0.25 0.26 0.41 0.49 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.43
Panel B: Excess corporate bond returns
dLt=½dLt þ dSt 1.14 5.66 2.94 9.77
[1.08] [2.65] [5.19] [4.60]
#RCLtþk  #RCStþk 5. 30 4.79 10.58 7.13
[5.27] [3.34] [6.15] [3.26]
yGLt  yGSt 3.82 3.57 3.68 2.85
[4.09] [3.11] [1.66] [1.59]
N 47 47 45 45 47 47 45 45
R2 0.30 0.31 0.41 0.48 0.19 0.29 0.06 0.40
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the lack of information on floating rate and call provisions. Using Compustat, we
construct a short time series (1976 through 1999) of the fraction of long-term debt
outstanding that is tied to a floating interest rate. We also construct a short time
series (1976 through 2000) of the fraction of long-term debt issues with call
provisions using data from the Securities Data Corporation. The Flow of Funds long-
term share is uncorrelated with the fraction of long-term debt linked to the prime
rate and has a correlation of 0:49 with the fraction of callable debt. In other words,
when firms issue a relatively high share of short-term debt, the long-term debt that
they issue is more likely to be callable—more like short-term debt in terms of its
effective cost—than is normally the case. Also interesting and consistent with the
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Table 6
Robustness tests, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data
OLS regressions predicting excess bond returns using the long-term share of total debt issues. The
specification for predicting one-year-ahead excess government bond returns, for example, is
rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b
dLt
dLt þ dSt
þ utþ1:
Excess bond returns are expressed in percentage terms. The independent variable is standardized to have
unit variance. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the excess return on long-term government bonds. In
Panel B, the dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds over commercial paper. We
examine aspects of robustness by (1) adjusting for floating rate and callable long-term debt, (2) varying the
sample period, and (3) varying the assumed retirement rate of long-term debt. t-statistics are
heteroskedasticity robust and correct for time-series dependence up to three lags. The F -test reports the
joint significance level of ðdL=Dt1Þ and ðdS=Dt1Þ:
Adjustment 1-year return Cum. 3-year return
dLt=½dLt þ dSt dLt=½dLt þ dSt
N b ½t R2 N b ½t R2
Panel A: Excess government bond returns
Unadjusted 47 3.18 [2.99] 0.10 45 10.47 [4.90] 0.39
Float adjusted 47 3.63 [3.34] 0.12 45 10.96 [5.24] 0.43
Call adjusted 47 2.86 [2.83] 0.08 45 10.41 [5.28] 0.36
1954–1976 23 0.72 [0.40] 0.01 23 1.15 [0.37] 0.01
1977–2000 24 5.32 [2.16] 0.11 22 21.24 [8.05] 0.61
Retirement rate ¼ 1=5 47 3.30 [3.41] 0.10 45 10.72 [4.64] 0.41
Retirement rate ¼ 1=20 47 2.93 [2.43] 0.08 45 9.80 [4.61] 0.33
Panel B: Excess corporate bond returns
Unadjusted 47 3.31 [3.93] 0.12 45 10.08 [4.71] 0.36
Float adjusted 47 3.61 [4.50] 0.14 45 10.55 [4.84] 0.40
Call adjusted 47 2.97 [3.09] 0.10 45 10.33 [5.40] 0.36
1954–1976 23 1.83 [1.04] 0.03 23 2.99 [0.91] 0.04
1977–2000 24 5.87 [3.64] 0.17 22 21.59 [7.79] 0.62
Retirement rate ¼ 1=5 47 3.33 [3.80] 0.12 45 10.23 [4.28] 0.38
Retirement rate ¼ 1=20 47 3.13 [3.50] 0.11 45 9.52 [4.65] 0.32
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message of Table 4, the fraction of long-term debt linked to prime, which has the
same cost characteristics as straight short-term debt, is itself positively correlated
with future bond returns (unreported).
As mentioned before, the forecasting power of the long-term share is likely to be
particularly diminished by counting long-term floating rate debt alongside long-term
fixed rate debt; issuing floating rate debt suggests an expectation that the relative cost
of long-term debt is high, not low. Using these series, we make an adjustment to
remove long-term callable issues from all debt issues and reclassify long-term debt
linked to prime as effectively short-term. These adjustments do not make much
difference.
The next two rows examine the stability of the relationships over time. We split the
sample into halves (1954–1976, 1977–2000). The long-term share is significant and
large within the later half but not the earlier half. Note that the earlier half also
corresponds to much lower volatility in inflation, the term spread, and excess bond
returns (see Fig. 1), so there may not be enough predictable variation in excess
returns in this period to induce informative adjustments in debt maturity. Consistent
with this explanation, the predictive power of the term spread is similarly unstable. A
univariate predictive regression using the term spread has an R2 of only 0.01 for one-
year returns or three-year cumulative returns in the earlier half of the sample, and for
three-year cumulative returns the coefficient is actually negative.9 One potential
interpretation is that, only to the extent that market conditions are informative
about future excess returns, the maturity of debt issues responds in proportion.
The last two rows examine our assumption that one-tenth of long-term debt is
retired each year. Alternative assumptions that the retirement rate is instead one-fifth
or one-twentieth give similar results. Finally, we have examined the effect of
removing individual years of data, and found that no single year of data drives the
results.
4. Debt issue maturity and the relative cost of long-term debt: Compustat sample
In this section we explore a second data source for corporate debt issues. We
generate time series from aggregations of Compustat firm-level data. To the extent
that the basic results line up with the Flow of Funds results, they reinforce our
previous robustness tests. Also, by varying the set of firms included in the
aggregations, we can examine whether there are any revealing cross-sectional
differences.
4.1. Compustat debt issues data
We calculate aggregate debt issues for various subsets of Compustat firms between
1976 and 1999. While Compustat has some coverage back to 1954, the early data
unfortunately cannot be used because only a small percentage of firm-years contain
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the required data.10 Thus the primary disadvantage of Compustat vis-"a-vis Flow of
Funds is its shorter coverage.
We define Compustat short-term debt issues as notes payable (Item 206).
Compustat long-term debt issues are the change in the level of long-term debt (Item
9) plus debt due in one year (Item 44). To be included in the aggregations, a
Compustat firm-year observation must have nonmissing debt data in both year t and
t  1: We then sum short- and long-term debt issues across firms and construct the
long-term share ðdLt=½dLt þ dStÞ as before. In 1976, the first year of our sample, the
aggregations include up to 6,084 security identifiers (CUSIPs), and this upper limit
grows steadily to a peak of 10,345 in 1996, then declines to 9,930 in 1999.
Over the 1976–1999 period for which they overlap, the Compustat series long-term
share is generally higher than the Flow of Funds series, possibly because Compustat
firms have better access to long-term debt markets than does the average firm. At an
annual frequency the two series have a correlation of 0.50.11
4.2. Issue maturity, the term spread, and bond return predictability: Compustat splits
With only 25 data points in the Compustat long-term share series, we are limited
to studying univariate relationships in Table 7. Panel A reports the relationship
between the Compustat share and the term spread. Panel B reports the predictive
power of the long-term share for one-year-ahead excess government bond returns.
The first row in each panel reports results for the long-term share calculated by
aggregating across all Compustat firms with usable data. The basic results echo the
Flow of Funds results: Compustat firms send to favor long-term debt when the term
spread is low and when future excess bond returns are low.12
The advantage of Compustat data is that it allows us to construct the long-term
share on specific cross-sectional dimensions. What type of firm is more likely to
make debt maturity decisions based on market conditions? One plausible source of
cross-sectional variation is differences in access to the maturity spectrum. Small,
young firms of low credit quality may be simply unable to issue long-term debt, while
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10Specifically, the percentage of firms covered by Compustat with nonmissing debt issues data starts at
about 25% in 1955 and does not level out at around 90% until 1976. This alone would not cause a bias,
but there is a pronounced tendency for the nonmissing observations to take on zero values. In 1960, for
instance, only four of the 86 firms with nonmissing debt issues data actually have nonzero notes payable;
the other 82 are zero. The percentage of firms with nonmissing and nonzero notes payable increases
steadily throughout the early years of the sample. Our best explanation for these patterns is that in early
balance sheet data, it is very common for notes payable and the current portion of long-term debt to be
combined. Compustat breaks down these values separately (which we require) only when it can confidently
do so. Most commonly, in the early years, this happens when the reported total is zero. When the total is
zero, Compustat can correctly infer that both of the components are zero. This explains why the
nonmissing observations on notes payable are mostly zero in the early data. As balance sheets have
become more detailed over time, this problem has been attenuated.
11A figure comparing the Flow of Funds and Compustat time series is available upon request.
12 In unreported results, we also find that the Compustat long-term share does not have incremental
predictive power over the term spread at the one-year horizon. This differs from our conclusion using Flow
of Funds data.
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established and more stable firms have more flexibility. Consistent with this
intuition, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that very long-term borrowing is
concentrated among large firms with investment grade credit ratings. In addition,
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the CFOs of large-cap and dividend-paying
firms are more likely to state that they attempt to time Treasury rates.13
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Table 7
The maturity of corporate debt issues, the term spread, and excess bond returns, Compustat data
Panel A shows OLS regressions explaining the Compustat long-term share in total debt issues with the
term spread. Panel B shows OLS regressions predicting one-year-ahead excess government bond returns
using the Compustat long-term share in total debt issues.
Panel A :
dLt
dLt þ dSt
¼ a þ bðyGLt  yGStÞ þ ut; Panel B : rGLtþ1  rGStþ1 ¼ a þ b
dLt
dLt þ dSt
þ utþ1;
Excess bond returns are expressed in percentage terms. The independent variables are standardized to have
unit variance. Debt issues data are firm-by-firm aggregations from Compustat. The firms included in each
aggregation are determined as follows: old firms are those that have Compustat data going back more than
five years; high credit quality firms have an investment grade rating from S&P in Compustat (note this is a
current, not historical debt rating); high market capitalization firms are those that fall above the NYSE
median (breakpoints provided by Ken French); dividend payers pay nonzero common dividends (Item 21).
t-statistics are heteroskedasticity robust and correct for time-series dependence up to three lags.
Panel A: Compustat long-term share on the term spread
yGLt  yGSt yGLt  yGSt
N b ½t R2 N b ½t R2
All firms 25 2.91 [4.59] 0.29
Old firms (> 5 years) 25 4.02 [4.16] 0.26 Young firms (p5 years) 25 0.52 [0.51] 0.01
High credit quality 25 2.90 [4.84] 0.28 Low credit quality 25 2.51 [2.55] 0.15
High market capitalization 25 4.06 [4.23] 0.25 Low market capitalization 25 1.31 [2.33] 0.13
Dividend payers 25 2.77 [3.71] 0.21 Nonpayers 25 4.51 [2.50] 0.12
Panel B: One-year-ahead excess government bond returns on the Compustat long-term share
dLt=½dLt þ dSt dLt=½dLt þ dSt
N b ½t R2 N b ½t R2
All firms 24 10.98 [2.57] 0.13
Old firms (> 5 years) 24 8.84 [4.13] 0.20 Young firms (p5 years) 24 5.78 [0.80] 0.05
High credit quality 24 11.58 [2.65] 0.15 Low credit quality 24 4.85 [0.77] 0.02
High market capitalization 24 9.67 [3.19] 0.16 Low market capitalization 24 0.13 [0.03] 0.00
Dividend payers 24 10.98 [2.94] 0.15 Nonpayers 24 0.09 [0.04] 0.00
13Specifically, Graham and Harvey ask three questions related to debt market timing: to paraphrase,
they are ‘‘Do you issue debt when interest rates are particularly low?’’; ‘‘Do you prefer short-term debt
when short-term interest rates are low compared to long-term rates?’’; and ‘‘Do you prefer short-term debt
when waiting for long-term market interest rates to decline?’’ CFOs of large capitalization firms, dividend
paying firms, and public firms were more likely to give a strong or very strong ‘‘yes’’ answer to each of
these questions. Since all Compustat firms are publicly traded, we split the sample by capitalization and
dividend-paying status.
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We split the Compustat data in several ways in order to test these patterns. The
results in Table 7 are generally consistent with the hypothesized relations. Panel A
shows that large, old, creditworthy, and dividend-paying firms align their long-term
share more closely to the term spread. The results on size and dividend-paying status
match up directly with the survey findings, and the results on credit quality are
consistent with the results of Guedes and Opler. Panel B shows that these same firms’
maturity decisions have particularly high predictive power for future excess bond
returns. These cross-sectional patterns complement and generally reinforce the Flow
of Funds sample results.
5. Discussion
The evidence that corporate debt maturity is closely tied to predictable variation in
excess bond returns adds a stylized fact to corporate finance. It also raises two
fundamental questions. Does the predictable variation reflect market inefficiency or
segmentation? And do firms reduce their overall cost of capital by substituting across
maturities in the observed manner?
The Modigliani-Miller theorem shows that these two questions are equivalent. In
efficient, integrated, and otherwise perfect markets, the theorem fixes the overall cost
of capital in proportion to cash flow risk alone. For example, consider a firm with a
fixed ratio of total debt to equity. The cash flow risk of the firm is shared by its equity
and short- and long-term debt holders. The only way to reduce the average cost of
the ‘‘portfolio’’ of short- and long-term debt is to increase the risk of the cash flows
to equity holders, thus increasing the cost of equity. The bottom line is that the costs
of different forms of capital do not vary independently in efficient and integrated
markets, so the overall cost of capital cannot be reduced. In inefficient or segmented
markets, by contrast, the MM theorem does not apply, and market timing—defined
generally as raising finance in whatever form is currently available at the lowest risk-
adjusted cost—can in those circumstances reduce the overall cost of capital.
This suggests three general explanations for our results.
Explanation (1): Rational managers, rational investors. The debt market is efficient
and integrated with the equity market. Debt issues are linked to time-varying excess
bond returns because optimal debt maturity structure is related to excess bond
returns.
Explanation (2): Rational managers, irrational investors. Managers successfully
time an inefficient debt market.
Explanation (3): Irrational managers, rational investors. Managers try in vain to
time an efficient debt market.
In the first explanation, manipulating the maturity does not (and is not intended
to) reduce the cost of capital. Excess bond returns and optimal debt maturity
structure are connected behind the scenes. In the second, the predictability of excess
bond returns that we observe is attributed to inefficiency, at least in part, and
managers are reducing the overall cost of capital by adjusting debt maturity in
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response. In the third explanation, managers try their hand at debt market timing
but are unsuccessful. Perhaps rules of thumb such as ‘‘issue short-term when the
yield curve is steep’’ simply redistribute overall cash flow risk across securities in a
way that they do not recognize, but investors do, and so the overall cost of capital is
not reduced. As we discuss below, we conclude that managers are almost surely
trying to time the debt market, but despite suggestive evidence it is hard to prove that
their efforts reduce the overall cost of capital. Thus we favor (2) or (3) over (1).
5.1. Debt market efficiency and integration with the equity market
Explanations (1) and (3) both maintain that the predictive power of the long-term
share reflects an efficient and integrated debt market. We examine this difficult
question here. We do not develop theories of debt market inefficiency per se. Prior
work on bond investor sentiment includes Modigliani and Sutch (1966a,b) and
Shiller (1996), who argue that investors have time-varying preferences for short- and
long-term debt, and Shiller et al. (1983), who argue that long-term rates overreact to
information more relevant to short-term rates. The survey evidence in Froot (1989)
also suggests that bond investors do not have unbiased expectations about changes
in interest rates.
In an efficient debt market, the long-term share is inversely related to future
returns because it is inversely related to time-varying risk. Covariance with
consumption is the only risk factor in Breeden (1979), and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) argue for the empirical validity of the consumption-based paradigm. In
unreported results (available upon request), we examine whether the long-term share
is inversely related to consumption covariance. Specifically, we use the methodology
of Duffee (2001) to test whether the Flow of Funds long-term share predicts a lower
covariance of excess bond returns with consumption growth. The relationship turns
out to be weak and of the wrong sign.
A second possibility is that the long-term share is connected to variance risk.
Breeden (1986) derives a relationship between expected excess bond returns and the
conditional variance of consumption. The intertemporal CAPM of Merton (1973)
and the Asset Pricing Theory of Ross (1976) admit multiple risk factors, and in some
implementations the risk premia are specified as related to the conditional variances
of underlying state variables (e.g., French et al., 1987). Several studies have
attempted to connect predictor variables to future variance risks. In unreported
results (available upon request), we follow Schwert (1989) and test whether the long-
term share predicts the standard deviation of conditional consumption growth or
conditional excess bond returns. The results are mixed. The long-term share is indeed
negatively related to future excess bond return variance but is marginally positively
related to future consumption variance. The former result is in the right direction for
a risk-based explanation, but the magnitude appears too small to account for large
return predictability effects. (A one-standard-deviation increase in the long-term
share reduces one-year-ahead excess returns by more than it reduces their standard
deviation, indicating a Sharpe ratio above one.)
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Finally, debt market timing could reduce the overall cost of capital if the debt and
equity markets are not perfectly integrated. Consider two firms with the same cash
flow risk and the same leverage. One firm switches between short- and long-term
debt following the historical pattern of the long-term share. The other uses long-term
debt exclusively. Ex post, the predictability results show that the first firm has paid
less for its debt. The MM theorem says that it must have paid commensurately more
for its equity, if markets are efficient and integrated, since equity would have to
absorb the cash flow risk allegedly responsible for the time-varying term premium.
One testable implication of this logic is that the long-term share should predict the
cost of equity in the same direction as the relative cost of long-term debt. In
unreported regressions of excess stock market returns on the Flow of Funds long-
term share, we find that the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant.
5.2. Optimal debt maturity structure
Explanation (1) also maintains that debt issues are related to future excess returns
because optimal debt maturity is connected to future excess returns. This is another
angle on this explanation that we can explore.
Perhaps surprisingly, only one theory of optimal debt maturity directly involves
interest rates: the tax theory developed by Brick and Ravid (1985, 1991) and outlined
in Gordon (1982). In this theory, managers accelerate tax deductions by issuing more
long-term debt when long-term rates are relatively high or, under a convex tax
schedule, when interest rates are particularly volatile. Tables 3 and 7 and the
unreported results described in the previous subsection, however, are opposite to this
prediction. Firms issue more long-term debt when the term structure is flat and
future interest rates are stable. The firm-level results in Barclay and Smith (1995),
Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996) also contradict the tax
theory.
It is possible to construct ad hoc stories to connect our predictability results to
optimal maturity theories without directly involving debt market conditions. One
such story involves debt overhang and time-varying business conditions. Myers
(1977) notes that an overhang of long-term debt can force firms to forgo positive net
present value investments that require new capital. To avoid this, firms with more
growth opportunities should prefer short-term debt. If growth opportunities vary
over time, the long-term share would then vary inversely. This theory does not
directly connect to subsequent bond returns, but Fama and French (1989) suggest
that expected excess bond returns are generally low when business conditions are
good—which is perhaps when growth opportunities are good and, according to the
debt overhang theory, when the long-term share should be low. This story appears to
predict a positive relationship between the long-term share and subsequent excess
bond returns, not the negative relationship that we observe. Furthermore, as Fig. 2
suggests, the NBER measure of business cycles is unconnected with the Flow of
Funds long-term share variable.
Another possible explanation involves time-varying liquidity risk. Diamond (1991)
and Rajan (1992) note that short-term debt may be difficult to refinance, leading to
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costly financial distress. This suggests that when liquidity risk is higher, the
preference for long-term debt will be higher. These models do not directly involve
interest rate risk. If one equates liquidity risk with interest rate risk, however, these
models tend to predict that when interest rate risk is high, corporations prefer long-
term debt. This is opposite to the evidence.
Yet another story involves liquidity itself as opposed to liquidity risk. Firms might
prefer to issue debt at the lowest current interest cost. One reason is to conserve
internal finance. Another reason is that managers have short horizons, and issuing
bonds at the lowest interest rate maximizes short-term earnings (as in Stein, 1989).
This links the long-term share to the term spread and perhaps to future excess bond
returns by coincidence, but does not explain why the long-term share has
incremental predictive power over and above the term spread in the Flow of Funds
data (Table 5), or why the long-term share is also negatively related to the real short
rate and inflation (Table 3).
Finally, several lines of argument lead to the principle that debt maturity should
be set to match asset maturity, including Myers (1977), Diamond (1991), and Hart
and Moore (1995). Graham and Harvey (2001) find maturity matching to be the
single most highly cited factor in debt maturity decisions. According to this principle,
the long-term share should be positively correlated with changes in aggregate asset
maturity. While this still does not connect to future excess bond returns, it does
represent a potentially testable implication. We construct a crude measure of changes
in asset maturity from balance sheet data reported by the Internal Revenue Service
(various issues) Statistics of Income. We estimate the maturity of net fixed assets as
the ratio of net fixed assets to depreciation expense and assume that the maturity of
all other assets is one year. We then estimate overall asset maturity as the book-value
weighted-average asset maturity; the weight on the maturity of fixed assets is net
fixed assets over total assets. This procedure is similar to that used in Guedes and
Opler (1996). We find that the correlation between annual changes in this asset
maturity proxy and the long-term share is negative and insignificant, which differs
from the positive correlation predicted by the matching theory. We hesitate to put
much value on this result, however. The quality of the proxy for fixed asset maturity
is questionable since depreciation expense is dictated as much by tax rules as by
economic reality, and our assumption about the maturity of nonfixed assets is even
more questionable.
5.3. Debt market timing
The discussion thus far casts most doubt on Explanation (1), which requires both
that the long-term share’s predictive power reflects a rational risk premium and that
optimal debt maturity varies inversely with this premium. The evidence for a risk
premium is ambiguous, and existing theory gives obscure accounts at best for a
negative relationship between optimal debt maturity and subsequent excess bond
returns.
Explanations (2) and (3) attribute the behavior of the maturity of debt issues to
market timing. There are realistic incentives for managers to try to time the debt
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market. The only requirement is that they care about shareholders. Indeed, many top
managers are large shareholders themselves, and most have their compensation
otherwise tied to share performance through bonus formulas and stock options.
In addition, surveys of managers essentially prove that debt market timing is an
explicit strategy. A substantial fraction of financial managers in the Graham and
Harvey (2001) survey state that they issue debt ‘‘when interest rates are particularly
low.’’ This is the single most highly cited factor in the debt policy decision. Given the
decision to issue debt, managers prefer short-term debt ‘‘when short-term interest
rates are low compared to long-term rates’’ and when they are ‘‘waiting for long-
term market interest rates to decline.’’ These are the third and fourth most highly
cited factors in the debt maturity decision. (The most highly cited factor is maturity
matching, as mentioned above, but this factor does not have an obvious time series
implication.) These statements indicate that the relationship between issue maturity
and market conditions is not coincidental. Moreover, our Compustat tests, described
above, find cross-sectional patterns that are consistent with cross-sectional
differences in survey responses.
Debt market timing and equity market timing differ in important respects. Most
notable, equity market timing is typically connected to inside information, while (at
least among firms with stable credit ratings) debt market timing can only be driven
by publicly available information; no firm has inside information about future
interest rates.14 This is consistent with our results—the predictability that firms use
to make debt maturity decisions appears to be the same predictability that is
available from publicly observed debt market conditions. Despite this key difference
between equity and debt market timing, the basic behavioral principle is the same.
Market timing managers are trying to substitute toward whatever form of finance
that they think is available at the lowest risk-adjusted cost.
We stress that our results cannot distinguish conclusively between Explanation (2)
and Explanation (3). We cannot tell whether firms are following rules of thumb, such
as ‘‘issue short when the term structure slopes upward,’’ which simply pick up
efficiently priced risk factors, or whether they have genuine market timing ability.
We find no direct evidence of a risk factor driving the variation in the long-term
share, but one may nonetheless be lurking. Huang and Huang (2002) argue that
corporate bond default spreads are too large relative to equity risk premia,
suggesting that these markets are in fact segmented, and Titman (2002) discusses
other evidence of segmentation.
6. Conclusion
We find that the maturity of debt issues is closely connected to predictable
variation in excess bond returns. Firms tend to issue long-term debt when future
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issuing when the market is particularly liquid.
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excess bond returns are predictably low. The long-term share in total debt issues
predicts excess bond returns on its own. Interestingly, this predictive power appears
largely to reflect its contemporaneous relationships with inflation, the real short-term
rate, and the term spread—variables which themselves predict excess bond returns.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers try to time the debt
market using publicly available market conditions as a guide to their maturity
decisions. It is difficult to tell whether issuing firms are actually reducing the overall
cost of capital, however, because of the usual difficulties in interpreting predictability
regressions. In any case, the results suggest that theories of debt maturity need to
incorporate a larger role for debt market conditions and excess bond return
predictability if they are to explain basic patterns in the data.
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